ABSTRACT In smart grid, the non-cooperative game is a popular method to model the profit competitions among utility companies, however, this game model requires the complete information of the utility companies, which are difficult to be implemented considering the privateness. Bayesian game is an efficient method in solving the incomplete information game problem. This paper formulates an incomplete information game for the pricing strategy of the utility companies. From a practical standpoint, the substitution elasticity among the utility companies is private, and thus the Bayesian game is applied to study the retail price of the competing utility companies. Then, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is studied and obtained by the wellknown fictitious play algorithm in symmetric case. Additionally, we consider the consumer's response to balance the electricity market. When the electricity energy is imbalance, we take the action purchasing the regulation service from the consumers rather than the spinning reserve from the generator set to reduce the financial cost. The illustrative examples are shown to verify the efficiency of the designed model. Specifically, the utility companies can maximize their profits by the Bayesian game with the incomplete information, and the change of the profit with market demand disruptions can be obtained.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an engineering economic method, game theory is applied to analyze the economic dispatch and energy management in smart grid. The complete information games, such as noncooperative game, cooperative game and dynamic game, are applied in smart grid. For example, a light-weight demand response scheme based on non-iterative Stackelberg game was developed in [1] . In [2] and [3] , the Markov game was proposed for energy management and energy efficiency in smart grid. A staggered clock-proxy auction (SCPA) mechanism for the energy scheduling was proposed in [4] . A twostage game framework for response management between the utility company and consumers was proposed in [5] .
Nash equilibrium was used to analyze the pricing strategy and energy optimization problem in smart grid in [6] and [7] . An aggregative game approach for energy consumption scheduling of electric vehicles and a demand-side pricing method were proposed in [8] and [9] . A new demand response model based on stochastic differential game and dynamic game for community energy storage (CES) were studied in [10] - [12] . A supermodular game modeling the competition of utility companies was proposed in [13] . Ma et al. [14] considered the load curtailment strategy and regulated the load by a noncooperative game model. Ma et al. [15] formulated a cooperative energy strategy and a punishment scheme for the uncooperative behaviors. Renewable energy management based on game theory in electricity market were developed in [16] and [17] . In [18] and [19] , the authors analyzed the electricity cost for communities of smart household and the management of PHEVs charging and discharging based on the coalitional game.
From a practical perspective, the incomplete information game has been studied in energy management. A Bayesian honeypot game model was introduced for advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) in the smart grid was proposed in [20] . A Bayesian coalition game modeling the routing problem was proposed in smart grid in [21] . Based on the incomplete information game, energy management for residential users was proposed in [22] . Considering the multiple electricity providers, electricity management for competing consumers based on Bayesian game was proposed in [23] and [24] .
The above works studied the gaming problem assuming the complete information sharing among the multiple utility companies. However, the complete information sharing is difficult to be implemented due to the privateness of the utility companies in the electricity markets. As far as we know, there is no work studying the gaming problem among the utility companies with incomplete information. Generally, the exact information (e.g., substitution elasticity) of utility companies will be obtained from each other in traditional noncooperative game, which is unrealistic. Thus, we model the relationship of the utility companies as a Bayesian game. The incomplete information game is more reasonable for only partial information is needed. Moreover, the demandside regulation, which has lower cost compared with spinning reserve in the generation side, can reduce the regulation cost of utility company in balancing the energy market. However, the demand-side regulation has not been considered in modeling the cost of utility company. In this paper, we introduce the payments for purchasing the regulation service into the cost model of utility company.The novelty of this work is to develop a pricing scheme for the utility companies considering the privateness and the demand-side regulation. The contributions of the paper are as follows:
• Considering the privateness of substitution elasticity in the utility company's cost model, we formulate the interaction of competing utility companies as a Bayesian game.
• For the proposed Bayesian game of the utility companies, the uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) is studied, and we derive the conditions on the uniqueness of the BNE.
• We introduce the demand response into the electricity market to provide the regulation service. The operation cost of utility company is modeled considering the payments to consumers for purchasing the regulation service.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II establishes an electricity market model and formulates the profit function. Section III provides the cost model of the consumers participating in the demand response. In Section IV, the competition of utility companies is formulated as the Bayesian game based on the private information. In Section V, simulations results are provided. Conclusions are summarised in Section VI.
II. ELECTRICITY MARKET
We consider an electricity market including one generation company, multiple competing utility companies and consumers. The structure diagram is shown in Fig. 1 . The generation company produces the electricity and sells it to the utility company at a wholesale price. Then the utility company can benefit by reselling the electricity to the consumers at a retail price. For the balance of electricity supply and demand, the utility company will purchase regulation service from consumers. Thus the cost of the utility company is composed of electricity purchasing cost and regulation cost. In the electricity market, the multiple utility companies will compete with each other by deciding their retail price to maximize the net benefit.
III. SYSTEM MODEL A. THE BENEFIT FROM THE SALE OF ELECTRICITY
The consumer's market demand for utility company i can be given as
where a i and p i denote the consumers' maximum market demand and the retail price for utility company i, respectively. d i denotes the elasticity coefficient, which is a measure of other utility company's price to the change of utility company i's sales [25] . For convenience, let
Then, the benefit of utility company i can be denoted as
(2)
B. THE COST FROM PURCHASING REGULATION SERVICE
The consumers have the motivation to adjust the loads flexibly for reducing the cost at the expense of comfort. We assume that the response of an individual consumer m(m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }) to the price is described by the following step function:
where ( = g(p r ) can be approximated to a continuous function, as shown in Fig. 3 .
The regulation cost of utility company i is expressed as:
VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 1. An electricity market. The optimal regulation price can be obtained by the following algorithm:
where µ k is the step size, p r is the regulation price.
C. THE PROFIT OF THE UTILITY COMPANY
The profit of the utility company with the consumers' participation in demand response can be modeled. Assume that w i is the wholesale price announced by the generation company and c s is the cost of the generation company, the profits of utility company i is given as
The function in (6) is the net benefit of the utility company. The first term is the revenue of selling energy to consumers, the second term is the cost (i.e., the payment for the generation company), and the last term is the payment for the consumers participating in regulation service.
IV. BAYESIAN GAME AMONG UTILITY COMPANIES
Given the wholesale price w i and the cost c s of the generation company, the utility companies will maximize their profits as in (6) by selecting a retail price. It is noted that the substitutability coefficient (substitution elasticity) of the utility companies is private, traditional noncooperative game model can not describe the problem. Assuming that the probability distribution of substitutability coefficient is public information, the interaction of the utility companies can be formulated as a Bayesian game. Given the actions p −i and types γ −i of other utility companies, the profit of utility company i corresponding to p i and γ i is denoted as
Furthermore, the expected profit is determined as
where
) is a vector of strategies taken by all utility companies. γ = (γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ N ) is a types vector of all utility companies.
Next, we give the definition of the utility company game.
Definition The utility company game is defined as G =
where N = {1, 2, . . . , N } is the set of the utility companies, i is the set of possible types of utility company i, P = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p N ) denotes the actions of the utility companies, π i (γ i ) is the action taken by the utility company i corresponding to type γ i , and U i (π i ) is the expected profit function of utility company i. Definition
A. BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In the subsection, the uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) will be studied and obtained. The BNE is the set of optimal price strategies of utility companies. It is necessary to derive the conditions on the uniqueness of the BNE. If a vector π = (π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π N ) satisfies
the vector π is a pure BNE. By taking the derivative of U i (p i , π −i ; γ i , γ −i ) with respect to γ i and p i , we have
As d i > 0 for all i, we have
Thus, the proposed game of utility company has at least one pure BNE [26] .
Next, we give the conditions on the uniqueness of the BNE. From [27] - [29] , when the utility company game satisfies the following conditions, it has a unique pure BNE:
There is a
There is a ∈ (0, ∞) for all
and
Theorem : The first two conditions are satisfied if and are determined as
and for
the proposed game has a unique pure BNE. Proof : From (7) and (16), we have
We assume that
By taking the first and second derivatives of U i (γ i ) with respect to r i , we have
As p i > p i , γ i ≥ 0, we have
It can be obtained that U i (γ i ) is a concave function of γ i from (25) , and
or
As p i − p i and j =i p 2 j ≤ p max , we have
i . Consequently, the condition (13) is verified.
Next, we prove the second condition, from (7) and (16), we have
By taking the partial derivative of i (p −i ) with respect to p j , j = i, we have
Generally, the Hermitian matrix of i (p −i ) is expressed as
Because of p i ≥ p i , we have η i ≥ 0. According to the algebraic manipulation, we can obtain that H is positive semi-definite. Consequently, i (p −i ) is a convex function. According to the Jensen's inequality:
we obtain
From (30), (31), and (38), we obtain
Therefore
The condition (14) is verified with determined, as given in (40).
To study the pure BNE, we consider the threshold structure to determine the best response strategy of the utility company π * (γ ). The threshold structure is given as follows:
is the best response action that the utility companies take, γ * k is the optimal type threshold, and γ min and γ max are the lower and upper bounds, respectively. Consequently, determining π * (γ ) can be replaced by searching for γ * k , and we have
From (41), the probability that one utility company takes action λ k can be denoted as
where f (γ ) denotes the probability density function, and F(γ ) denotes the cumulative distribution of type γ . Following action λ k in (42), the expected payoff of utility company i can be denoted as
where h π (p j ) is the probability that the utility company j take action p j (p j ∈ P). Then, the BNE can be obtained by the fictitious play (FP) algorithm [30] , [31] . The iterative process of the FP algorithm is shown in Fig. 4 .
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, the simulation results are provided to evaluate the performance of the proposed model. We select three utility companies (UCs) and assume the demand scale of the three utility companies are a 1 = 12000KWh, a 2 = 15000KWh, and a 3 = 18000KWh, respectively. There are four optimal actions P = [6, 7, 8, 9] , and the strategy of utility company is defined as
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In the proposed game model, the utility companies select the optimal price strategy according to (46) . Without the proposed game, the utility companies will select a lower price randomly. It is assumed that the substitution elasticities of three UCs are γ 1 = 0.2, γ 2 = 0.4, γ 2 = 0.5. Table 1 compares the profits of the utility companies with the proposed game (WBG) and without it (WOBG), from which we can observe that the profits are significantly increased. Next, the influence of the number of utility companies on the optimal strategy corresponding to the belief is studied. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the convergence of belief h * with the 4 and 5 utility companies, respectively. The threshold structure with 4 and 5 UCs are obtained as respectively. From Figs. 5-7, it is observed that the FP algorithm can converge to the optimal thresholds within 50 iterations. The threshold differences in Figs. 5-7 are compared in Fig. 8 . It can be obtained that the probabilities of selecting π * (γ ) = 6 and π * (γ ) = 9 are decreased and the probabilities of selecting π * (γ ) = 7 and π * (γ ) = 8 are increased when the number of the utility companies increases. Furthermore, to facilitate the analysis, we select three utility companies to analyze the demand disruption influence on the profits of the utility companies and the generation company. The demand scale of the three utility company are a 1 = 12000KWh, a 2 = 15000KWh, and a 3 = 18000KWh, respectively. The prices of the generation company are shown in Table 2 . It is assumed that demand disruptions of three utility companies are setting as [−4MWh, 4MWh], [−8MWh, 8MWh], and [−0.8MWh, 8MWh], respectively. The profits of the three utility companies and the generation company are given in Table 3 , and the change of the profits are shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 . As shown in Fig. 9 , increasing the demand disruption can improve the profits of the first and third utility companies, however it reduces the profit of the second utility company. From Fig. 10 , we observe that the demand disruption can also improve the profits of the generation company from the first and third utility companies and reduce the profit from the second utility company.
Additionally, the regulation price that minimize the regulation cost is optimized by the algorithm (5). We assume that the response function of consumers is as following:
where α, β, and ω are 0.5, 10, and 30, respectively. The convergence of the regulation price is shown in Fig. 11 . It can VOLUME 6, 2018 be observed that the regulation price converges to the optimal value $1.72 after 15 iterations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a Bayesian game framework among multiple utility companies with incomplete information and considere the consumers' participation to balance the electricity market when modeling the cost of utility company. The conditions on the uniqueness of the BNE is given and a FP algorithm is applied to search for the BNE. We find that the Bayesian game can improve the profits of the utility companies significantly and the FP algorithm converges to the optimal threshold within 50 iterations. Moreover, the influences of the demand disruption on the profits of the utility companies and the generation companies are studied. It demonstrates that the proposed game is effective to solve the problem that the competing utility companies cannot obtain the private information from each other. In real electricity markets, the proposed method can guide the utility companies to increase the profits by the designing electricity prices with incomplete information. This study only considered one parameter (e.g., substitution elasticity) as the private information. It is challenging to consider more uncertain information in the game. An interesting direction for future research is to formulate a robust game with incomplete information among the utility companies.
